The Gulf energy and telecom operator-set, worked continuously for a decade.
Also tracked as Twisted Kitten · Cobalt Gypsy · Crambus · Helix Kitten · APT 34 · APT34 · IRN2 · ATK40 · G0049 · Evasive Serpens · Hazel Sandstorm · EUROPIUM
Summary
OilRig is a threat actor attributed to Iran (Islamic Republic of), assessed as espionage-motivated. Its recorded targeting runs to chemical, energy, engineering, finance and adjacent sectors across 8 countries in the open reporting we hold — Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Middle East among them.
Across 76 attributed ATT&CK techniques we resolve 19 distinct behaviours — the things they do that a detection can be written against. The two that account for most of their observed tradecraft are discovery command burst on one host and valid account abuse or account creation. Their toolkit is 30 named items: 18 we see only in this actor's reporting and 12 commodity or dual-use. That ratio is the point — the first group is what identifies them, the second is what they share with every other group and with red teams.
For a Gulf defender the relevant line is the victimology: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Middle East appear in the reporting behind this record. That is evidence of past targeting, not a forecast, and it is drawn from what vendors chose to publish — an actor working quietly in a market nobody reports on looks identical to one that is absent.
As MITRE describes them: “OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. OilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks ” — MITRE ATT&CK, CC BY 4.0.
On the name. “OilRig” labels a cluster of related activity tracked under one name — not a verified organisation. Whether one team, several contractors or a rotating cast sits behind it is not something this record establishes, and the vendor names below are separate groupings that only mostly overlap.
02 — The detection plan
Most actor profiles hand you indicators that expire in days. These are the behaviours the actor cannot drop without changing how they operate, each with the reason it holds. Weight is our own: how much of the actor's observed tradecraft the behaviour accounts for.
The persistence mechanism and the directory it points at both outlive the payload. The discriminator is the TARGET PATH, not the task or key name, which the actor can change freely.
8 techniques · weight 5
Few legitimate processes read LSASS memory, so precision is high in most estates once the agents that do are excluded.
2 techniques · weight 5
A script file appearing under a web root outside a deployment window is close to a binary signal, and it catches the entry vector rather than the aftermath.
2 techniques · weight 5
The delivery wrapper changes constantly; an office, archive or browser process parenting a shell is the same shape across all of them.
8 techniques · weight 5
Nothing legitimate disables the estate's own defences at endpoint scale, and the action reliably precedes the part of the intrusion you care about.
9 techniques · weight 5
Kept separate from the LSASS rule because it needs different telemetry and tunes differently — a browser credential store read by a non-browser process is its own signal.
8 techniques · weight 4
Encodes the naming RULE rather than the filenames, so it survives every rename. The convention is a habit; the names are inventory.
6 techniques · weight 4
The command-line SHAPE — the flag combination, not the payload — is stable for months to years and cheap to match.
8 techniques · weight 4
Chosen to avoid a shell, so command-line rules miss it entirely. The broker is a stable choice; what it runs is not.
6 techniques · weight 4
Visible only in identity telemetry, and the failure-then-success shape is what distinguishes it from ordinary user error.
6 techniques · weight 3
The set of system binaries that can fetch a file is small and changes with the OS, not with the actor.
5 techniques · weight 3
Lateral movement leaves a service-creation or admin-share write that is the same regardless of the tool that made it.
6 techniques · weight 3
Staging is a step the actor cannot skip, and it happens before the data leaves — the last cheap place to catch it.
7 techniques · weight 3
Not a durable behavioural signature but the entry vector for a large public estate — worth an exposure control even where the detection is weak.
3 techniques · weight 3
Only worth building where removable media is permitted at all — check the policy before spending tuning hours on it.
5 techniques · weight 3
The tunneller is a tool choice that persists for months, and the traffic shape is visible even when the payload is not.
8 techniques · weight 3
Produces no malware event at all — the only trace is in identity telemetry, which is why an endpoint-only programme has a blind spot exactly here.
10 techniques · weight 3
The URI shape and cadence are cheap to match and hold for weeks to months — but the destination itself rotates in days, so match the pattern rather than the host.
7 techniques · weight 3
No single discovery command is worth an alert. The DENSITY is — several distinct recon binaries on one host inside an hour is a shape ordinary use does not produce.
17 techniques · weight 2
No single behaviour here is worth waking someone. Summed weights of 6 on one host inside a window is an alert; 10 is an incident. The pair that most reliably means this actor rather than commodity crime is Persistence pointing into world-writable staging + Credential access against LSASS — seen together, treat as an incident regardless of total.
03 — Tooling
Purpose is derived, not asserted: each tool's own ATT&CK techniques are resolved to tactics, and the tactics it spends most of its techniques in are what it is for.
Actor-specific means we have no record of it outside this actor's reporting — those are the names that identify them. Commodity covers everything sold, published or shared: Cobalt Strike and Brute Ratel are licensed red-team software every pentester owns, Mimikatz and Impacket are public, and backdoors like ShadowPad circulate between unrelated groups. Finding a commodity tool tells you far less, which is exactly why the split is drawn. ATT&CK's own “malware vs tool” type answers a different question — whether the software is malicious — so it is not used for this.
Actor-specific — 18 items
Gathering data and staying resident.
Gathering data and network reconnaissance.
Moving data out and gathering data.
Gathering data and moving data out.
Evading defences and remote control.
Gathering data and moving data out.
Moving data out and gathering data.
Moving data out and remote control.
Gathering data and moving data out.
Moving data out and remote control.
Moving data out and remote control.
Destruction or extortion and privilege escalation.
Remote control and running code.
Gathering data and staying resident.
Moving data out and remote control.
Staying resident and remote control.
Evading defences and running code.
Moving data out and remote control.
Commodity and dual-use — 12 items
Credential theft and moving between hosts.
Staying resident and moving between hosts.
Moving between hosts and staying resident.
Moving data out and remote control.
Gathering data and remote control.
Moving data out and moving between hosts.
Credential theft and disabling defences.
We hold none. Our corpus carries 9,780 hashes, but they come from live feeds covering current commodity campaigns — not the decade-old actor-specific backdoors in the list above. ATT&CK itself publishes no sample hashes; it is a technique knowledge base. Where a sample would have to come from a third party’s family tag rather than from this actor’s reporting, we leave the row empty instead of implying an attribution we cannot support.
04 — Coverage, honestly counted
Of the techniques attributed to OilRig, 58 fold into the detection plan above, 6 describe preparation you cannot see from inside your network, and 12 are uncatalogued — we have not yet placed them. That last number is published on purpose; it is the honest size of the gap.
05 — The chain
The same techniques as above, sequenced. Useful for deciding where to spend a detection: the earlier a tactic sits, the more of the intrusion you still get to prevent.
06 — Tradecraft artefacts
Pulled from primary vendor research and kept attributed. These are hunt starting points, not detections — a path an actor used once is worth a query, not a rule.
| Artefact | Kind | First reported by | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| %programdata%\PolGuid\in.txt | file path | The Hacker News | 2026-03-05 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid.zip | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid\.The | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid\VLC\VLC.exe | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid\WingetUI\WingetUI.exe | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid\WingetUI\WingetUI.exe.Creates | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\PolGuid\out.txt.Persistence | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| %programdata%\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe | file path | Check Point Research | 2026-07-06 |
| %programdata%\WinWebex | file path | Zscaler | 2026-03-02 |
| HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | registry | The Hacker News | 2026-04-30 |
| HKCU\Software\Classes\.wdlp | registry | Unit 42 | 2026-03-16 |
07 — Sourcing, graded
NATO Admiralty grading. The letter is the source's reliability, the number the credibility of the claim. We separate primary vendor research from outlets reporting on it, because ten articles derived from one report is one report.
| Grade | Source | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| B2 | MITRE actor record | 65 references across 35 distinct research hosts |
| C3 | Cloudsek | 6 items — reporting on other vendors' research |
| B2 | ESET | 5 items — primary vendor research |
| B2 | Group-IB | 4 items — primary vendor research |
| C3 | The Hacker News | 4 items — reporting on other vendors' research |
| B2 | Zscaler | 2 items — primary vendor research |
| B2 | Check Point Research | 2 items — primary vendor research |
| — | Estate telemetry | no data — absent, not negative |
30 items · 11 outlets · 20% of reporting traces to a single outlet
08 — What we do not know
Every vendor profile has these. Most omit them, which leaves you unable to tell a quiet actor from an unobserved one.
No URI paths, headers or beacon sequences for any family we hold, and no URL indicators at all to derive them from — the indicator set is hashes, hosts and addresses.
No domains are attributed to this actor in our holdings, so no naming convention, TLD preference or hosting pattern can be derived.
09 — Outlook
Probability language is ICD 203. Likelihood and confidence are stated separately: how likely we think it is, and how good our basis is for thinking so.
11 — Related actors
Ranked by shared victimology first, shared attribution second. The reason is on each card.
Credential phishing at scale against Gulf government and academic mail.
Travel, telecom and personal-movement data across Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
VPN and edge-appliance exploitation into Kuwaiti and Saudi networks.
10 — Primary sources
65 of them. Published in full so the page can be checked rather than believed.
Run it against your own estate
The library is the part we can publish. The platform runs the same detection plan against your own estate, tells you which of these behaviours you already cover, and retro-hunts the rest — on your hardware, with nothing leaving the building.